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ORIGINAL RESEARCH REPORT
Does Power Increase Self-Control? Episodic Priming May 
Not Provide the Answer
Sonja Heller and Johannes Ullrich
Powerful people (e.g., political and business leaders) should be able to control their impulses and act in line 
with long-term rather than short-term interests. However, theories of power suggest different answers 
to the question whether the basic experience of feeling powerful decreases (e.g., Keltner, Gruenfeld, & 
Anderson, 2003) or increases self-control performance (e.g., Magee & Smith, 2013). We conducted a pre-
registered direct replication of the only experiment testing the effects of power on self-control (Joshi & 
Fast, 2013, Study 3). In contrast to the original results, social power, operationalized by episodic priming, 
did not affect temporal discounting. A possible explanation is the fact that the power priming failed to 
elevate participants’ sense of power. Thus, the null findings challenge the power priming paradigm rather 
than the two theories from which opposite predictions were derived. In order to understand how power 
affects self-control, future research may need to rely on other manipulations.
Keywords: Social power; self-control; power priming; temporal discounting; direct replication
How does feeling powerful prepare individuals for exercis-
ing self-control, i.e. to pursue long-term goals? Laypeople 
seem to agree that powerful people such as organizational 
or political leaders should be particularly persistent, dis-
ciplined, and responsible (Lord, Foti, & Vader, 1984). Two 
influential theories in power research – the approach/
inhibition theory of power (Keltner et al., 2003) and the 
social distance theory of power (Magee & Smith, 2013) – 
make opposite predictions with regard to the effects of 
power on self-control. 
Within the framework of the approach/inhibition the-
ory of power, Keltner and colleagues suggest that (1) high 
power activates the behavioral approach system which is 
sensitive to rewards and opportunities, and (2) low power 
activates the behavioral inhibition system which is sensi-
tive to punishment, threat, and uncertainty. Briefly sum-
marized, Keltner and colleagues propose that high power 
triggers approach-related positive affect, attention to 
rewards, automatic cognition, and disinhibited behavior, 
whereas reduced power activates inhibition-related nega-
tive affect, systematic cognition, and situationally con-
strained behavior. Accordingly, due to their heightened 
attention to rewards and their drive to experience these 
rewards immediately, powerful people should show rela-
tively poor self-control.
In contrast, the social distance theory of power (Magee & 
Smith, 2013) assumes that high-power individuals exhibit 
better self-control than low-power individuals. Magee and 
Smith propose that asymmetric dependence between 
two individuals gives rise to asymmetric experiences of 
social distance, with the high-power individual feeling 
more subjective distance than the low-power individual. 
Based on assumptions of construal level theory (Trope & 
Liberman, 2010), the authors assume that because high-
power individuals perceive larger social distance, they 
engage in more abstract mental representation (i.e., 
higher level construal) than low-power individuals. High-
level construals have been shown to have a positive effect 
on self-control (e.g., Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 
2006; Schmeichel, Vohs, & Duke, 2011). Accordingly, due 
to their use of high-level construal of goals and situations, 
powerful people should show good self-control.
In line with the assumptions of the social distance 
theory of power, Joshi and Fast (2013) showed in three 
studies that experimentally induced social power benefits 
the pursuit of long-term goals by reducing the preference 
for smaller immediate gains over larger future gains (i.e., 
temporal discounting). When two theories make different 
predictions and only one is supported, the question arises 
as to what extent the other theory should be modified or 
discarded. Given the practical importance of self-control 
among powerful individuals, research must identify the 
conditions under which one or the other theory is correct. 
However, considering that the only available evidence 
on the research question comes from a single lab, it seems 
reasonable to first ask if the effect found by Joshi and 
Fast (2013) is robust before future research can system-
atically explore moderators of the effect. This first step is 
an important one: As all findings result from a combina-
tion of signal (an underlying effect) and noise (systematic 
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error in form of moderators as well as unsystematic error 
in form of measurement error), direct replication is the 
only way to separate the noise from the signal and average 
across different types of error (Simons, 2014).
The current work was an attempt to replicate Study 3 
from Joshi and Fast (2013). This study was chosen for two 
reasons. First, it is the only one that had a 3-cell design 
(high power, low power and control condition) and would 
therefore show whether the effect is attributable to high 
or low power (Singh, 1998). Second, it was assumed that 
preferences for gains in air quality (nonmonetary temporal 
discounting) would be more comparable across industrial-
ized nations (USA vs. Germany/Switzerland) than prefer-
ences for monetary rewards where differences in currency, 
purchasing power, and inflation might play a role.
In the original web-based study, 78 students experi-
enced a power or control priming, then completed a 
measure of connection with their future self and finally 
the nonmonetary temporal discounting task. We con-
ducted a pre-registered direct replication study (osf.io/
um3rq) based on the Replication Recipe (Brandt et al., 
2014) using a substantially larger sample. A successful 
replication would find a significant effect of the power 
manipulation, in that participants in the high power con-
dition would have lower discount rates than participants 
in the neutral and low power conditions.
Method
All study materials and procedures can be accessed via 
osf.io/dqr4m. The present research was done in accord-
ance with the checklist issued by the responsible ethics 
committee of the Faculty of Philosophy, University of 
Zurich, meaning that no formal approval was needed. This 
research respects the Ethical Principles of Psychologists 
and Code of Conduct by the American Psychological Asso-
ciation (APA) as well as the Ethics Guidelines for Psycholo-
gists by the Swiss Psychological Society.
Participants
Sample size was determined based on considerations of 
statistical power. Simonsohn (2015) noted that the con-
ventional approach of using the effect size estimate of 
the original study may be problematic. First, publication 
bias may inflate published effect sizes. Second, a replica-
tion may be uninformative when the confidence interval 
of the replication effect size does not only include zero, 
but also a detectable effect, that is, an effect size that 
the original study could have detected with 33% power. 
According to the recommendations by Simonsohn (2015) 
at least 2.5 times as many observations as the original 
study should be collected to have about 80% power to 
reject the null hypothesis of a detectable effect (i.e., in 
this case NOriginal = 78, minimum NReplication = 195). In the 
present case, a power analysis assuming Joshi and Fast’s 
(2013) sample size, equal per cell sample sizes1 and statis-
tical power of 33% indicated that the minimum detect-
able effect was equal to Cohen’s d = 0.35. The desired 
sample size was set to NReplication = 258 because this affords 
80% power to reject the null hypothesis that the effect is 
zero if the effect is detectable (i.e., d = 0.35) and (at least) 
80% power to reject the null hypothesis of a detectable 
effect if the effect is in fact zero.
In total, 636 participants gave their consent to par-
ticipate in the study (210 participants in the high power 
condition, 218 participants in the control condition, 208 
participants in the low power condition). On the third page 
of the online questionnaire where participants were meant 
to experience the power priming, 129 participants in the 
high power condition, 69 participants in the control con-
dition, and 103 participants in the low power condition 
dropped out. Comparing all three groups, the dropout rates 
differed significantly, χ2(2) = 38.64, p < .01. Taking only 
the two power conditions into consideration, the dropout 
rates still differed significantly, χ2(1) = 5.53, p = .02, with 
61% vs. 50% dropping out of the study after reading the 
instructions for the high vs. low power priming. This could 
be a cause for concern if dropout was systematically related 
to individual differences. Unfortunately, participants were 
asked for their demographics (gender and age) only at 
the very end of the experiment (in line with Joshi & Fast). 
Accordingly, we were not able to test if gender and condi-
tion interact in predicting dropout rates. However, if this 
was the case we would observe different proportions of 
men in women in the three conditions, which we do not, 
χ2(2) = 0.82, p = .66 (high power: 36% men, control: 40% 
men, low power: 43% men). Furthermore, if age was con-
founded with condition, we would observe differences in 
the mean age across the three conditions, which we do not 
either, F(2,278) = 0.04, p = 0.96 (high power: 27.24 years, 
control: 27.29 years, low power: 27.56 years). Likewise, pro-
portions of students vs. professionals did not differ across 
conditions, χ2(2) = 0.09, p = .96 (high power: 45% students, 
control: 45% students, low power: 47% students). In light 
of these results, we believe that systematic dropout does 
not affect the validity of our manipulation.
Finally, several participants were excluded based on the 
following a priori exclusion rules: no answers to either the 
questions referring to the connection to the future self 
or the temporal discounting questions (31 participants), 
inconsistent discounting pattern (16 participants), no dis-
counting at all (6 participants), no meaningful description 
of the situation in which they had/did not have power/
were shopping (19 participants). In summary, 22 partici-
pants in the high power condition, 24 participants in the 
control condition and 26 participants in the low power 
condition were excluded. The exclusion rates did not dif-
fer significantly across condition, χ2(2) = 4.768, p = .092. 
The final sample consisted of 263 participants (Mage = 
27.21 years, SD = 7.21 years), 98 men, 147 women and 
18 participants of unknown gender.
Materials and Procedure
A convenience sample was invited via snowball sampling 
to take part in an online study on decision behavior. Par-
ticipants gave their written consent and were then ran-
domly assigned to one of the following three conditions: 
participants recalled and wrote about a situation when 
they had power (high power, 59 participants), or when 
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they lacked power (low power, 79 participants) or when 
they last went to the grocery store (control condition, 125 
participants). Following the power manipulation, partici-
pants completed a measure of connection with the future 
self. Participants selected one of seven, increasingly over-
lapping pairs of circles to indicate how “connected” and 
how “similar” they felt to their selves in 10 years. These 
two items were averaged to form a measure of partici-
pant’s connection with his/her future self with higher val-
ues indicating a stronger connection.
The next part of the study consisted in the nonmon-
etary temporal discounting task. Within this paradigm, a 
participant makes a number of choices between a larger 
and several smaller rewards, where the smaller reward is 
available sooner than the larger one (Green & Myerson, 
2004; Smith & Hantula, 2008). Participants were provided 
with eight binary choices between “improved air quality 
immediately for 21 days” and “improved air quality one 
year from now for [number of] days.” The number of days 
in the future was 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, or 35. A single 
indifference point for each participant was obtained. This 
is the point at which participants equally value present 
and future gains. It was calculated by averaging the num-
ber of days between which participants switched from 
preferring the present option to preferring the future 
option. A high indifference point represents a tendency to 
prefer a smaller and more immediate reward or a failure 
to consider long-term potential consequences.
Next, participants completed the Personal Sense of 
Power Scale (Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012). Participants 
stated their agreement to 8 items such as “I think I have 
a great deal of power” on a scale from 1 (I disagree) to 5 
(I agree). Cronbach’s alpha was α = .72. All the original 
materials for the study were available from the authors. 
All instructions were direct translations.
After the direct replication, we collected additional 
measures that are not relevant for present purposes. For 
more information on the procedure and results related to 
these measures please consult the separate report on the 
Open Science Framework (osf.io/j67ep). Finally, partici-
pants were asked for their demographics.
A few details differed between our study and that of 
Joshi and Fast (2013) beyond the obvious differences in 
language and national context. First, we did not counter-
balance the order of the connection with the future self 
scale and the temporal discounting task because the for-
mer was described as a mediating variable by Joshi and 
Fast. Second, our sample did not only include students 
(110 participants) but also professionals (135 partici-
pants, no such information available for 18 participants). 
Although professionals were older (Mstudent = 24.55, SD = 
2.92; Mprofessional = 29.38, SD = 8.77), t(169.02) = 6.01, 
p < .01, and reported a slightly higher socioeconomic sta-
tus (Mstudent = 3.12, SD = 0.84; Mprofessional = 3.31, SD = 0.94), 
t(241.06) = 1.77, p = .08, these two groups were collapsed 
as the effects in the two groups were similar. Third, in the 
original experiment participants took part in exchange for 
course credit. In our replication, participants were invited 
to take part in a prize draw, in which they could win one 
of three vouchers worth 30 CHF/30 EUR (corresponding 
to approximately 33 USD) each.
Results
Manipulation Check
Two coders, who were blind to both conditions and 
hypotheses, categorized what type of relationship (e.g., 
manager – subordinate, teacher – student) was described 
in participants’ responses to the writing prompts. They 
were instructed to reach agreement for this categoriza-
tion. Table 1 shows that 98.3% of participants in the high 
power and 92.4% of participants in the low power condi-
tion wrote about experiencing power (or the lack thereof) 
in various relationships. Their responses were rated by 
the same two coders for how much power the participant 
reported having using a scale ranging from 1 (none at 
all) to 5 (very much). The interrater reliability (agreement 
definition) was good, ICC = .84. We used the mean rating 
of two raters as dependent variable for the manipulation 
check. Participants described themselves as having more 
power in the high-power essays (M = 4.02, SD = 0.58) than 
in the low-power essays (M = 1.39, SD = 0.66), t(127) = 
23.66, p < .01.
Type of relationship High power condition Control condition Low power condition
Manager – subordinate 13.6 0.0 22.8
Parent – child 11.9 0.0 8.9
Peers 8.5 0.0 1.3
Interview/admission 15.3 0.0 16.5
Teacher – student 10.2 0.0 11.4
Friends/relatives 8.5 0.0 3.8
Romantic/dating/sexual partners 6.8 0.0 1.3
Miscellaneous 23.7 0.0 26.9
No power relationship/Unclear 1.7 100.0 7.6
Table 1: Percent of power relationship types described by participants.
Note. Types of relationships that totaled less than 1% were aggregated to form the category “Miscellaneous”.
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Preliminary Analyses
A one-factorial ANOVA on the personal sense of power 
revealed no difference across conditions, F(2,259) = 0.28, 
p = .75, ηp
2 = 0.002, 95% CI [0, 0.02]. Furthermore, there 
were no significant differences between conditions in 
temporal discounting, F(2,260) = 0.27, p = .76, ηp
2 = 0.002, 
95% CI [0, 0.02], or the felt connection with the future 
self, F (2,260) = 0.20, p = .82, ηp
2 = 0.002, 95% CI [0, 0.02] 
(for descriptives see Table 2). 
Table 3 shows the intercorrelations of all measured vari-
ables. Only one correlation was significant: Personal sense 
of power was positively related to a stronger connection 
with the future self. Although only correlational evidence, 
this supports Joshi and Fast’s reasoning that high power 
should increase the connection with the future self.
Main Hypothesis Test
Joshi and Fast (2013) reported a significant contrast 
between participants in the high-power condition and 
those in the low-power and baseline conditions com-
bined. The same analysis performed on the present 
data indicated a non-significant difference in the same 
direction as the effect reported by Joshi and Fast (2013), 
t(261) = 0.71, p = .48, d = 0.09, 95% CI [–0.15, 0.33]. Thus, 
the confidence interval indicates that the effect is consist-
ent with the null hypothesis of no effect but inconsist-
ent with the null hypothesis of a detectable effect (which 
was determined to be d = .35 see above). As for the pre-
sumed mediator of the effect observed by Joshi and Fast 
(2013), high-power participants did not score higher on 
the measure of connection with the future self than did 
participants in the other two conditions, t(261) = 0.33, 
p = .74, d = 0.04, 95% CI [–0.20, 0.28].
Discussion
Replication constitutes an important contribution to 
cumulative science because it allows for testing the 
robustness of results and hence provides researchers with 
greater confidence about the existence and direction of 
effects (Brandt et al., 2014; Klein et al., 2014). Given the 
importance of understanding the relationship between 
social power and self-control, we sought to replicate Joshi 
and Fast’s (2013, Study 3) finding that power increases 
self-control (d = .53). Using a much larger sample size but 
nearly identical procedures as Joshi and Fast we obtained 
a much smaller effect (d = 0.09, 95% CI [–0.15, 0.33]). This 
non-significant effect is informative because it is signifi-
cantly smaller than an effect that would give the origi-
nal study a statistical power of 33% (i.e., the minimum 
detectable effect; Simonsohn, 2015) and that the current 
research had 80% statistical power to detect (i.e., d = .35). 
One straightforward implication of this result is that 
future replication studies relying on the procedures used 
by Joshi and Fast (2013) should be prepared to collect 
even larger samples to achieve adequate statistical power. 
Ultimately, though, researchers are likely to be more 
interested in the validity of the theoretical claims about 
the effects of social power than in the reproducibility of 
one particular study using a specific methodology. On 
the face of it, the null finding regarding the relation of 
power and discounting would seem to disconfirm the 
predictions derived from both the social distance theory 
of power (predicting a negative effect) and the approach/
inhibition theory of power (predicting a positive effect). 
However, every empirical study involves auxiliary assump-
tions regarding the operations and measures used to test 
a theory, and those may be wrong as well. Most promi-
nently, the validity of the manipulation and measures 
might be questioned.
Temporal discounting as operationalization of self-
control is a well validated and common paradigm in psy-
chology and economics. It has successfully been used in 
pathological (e.g., substance addicts, MacKillop, Amlung, 
Few, Ray, Sweet, & Munafò, 2011; pathological gamblers, 
Dixon, Marley, & Jacobs, 2003) as well as in normal popu-
lations, in student as well as non-student populations (e.g., 
Buono, Whiting, & Sprong, 2015), in the USA as well as in 
Germany and Switzerland (e.g., Gianotti, Figner, Ebstein, & 
Knoch, 2012; Peters, & Büchel, 2009). 
Admittedly, the air quality delay discounting task that 
was employed in the original study differed in two aspects 
from more widely used versions of this task: the number 
Measure High power condition (n = 59) Control Condition (n = 125) Low power condition (n = 79)
Personal sense of power 3.97 (0.48) 3.91 (0.59) 3.93 (0.47)
Connection with future 
self
4.30 (1.45) 4.31 (1.44) 4.42 (1.39)
Discount factor 0.39 (0.27) 0.42 (0.26) 0.43 (0.25)
Table 2: Means and standard deviations.
Personal sense of power Connection with future self
Connection with future self 0.23
Discount factor 0.07 0.08
Table 3: Intercorrelations of measured variables.
Note. Correlations that equal or exceed .13 (.16) are significant at the .05 (.01) level.
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of delays and the discounted reward. Although it is more 
common to administer temporal discounting tasks with 
several delays, the one-shot discounting task chosen by 
Joshi and Fast should yield comparable results to a more 
comprehensive version of this task. Reimers, Maylor, 
Stewart, and Chater (2009) compared a one-shot discount-
ing task with a discounting task with several delays and 
obtained comparable results. In a similar vein, Yi, Pitcock, 
Landes, and Bickel (2010) found that valid and sensitive 
discounting indices can be obtained with fewer indiffer-
ence points than the standard number of 5 or 7. Regarding 
the nature of the discounted reward, an improvement 
in air quality for 21 days may seem relatively intangible 
(and maybe irrelevant) in comparison to receiving (hypo-
thetical) monetary rewards for oneself. However, previous 
studies showed that temporal discounting occurs when 
environmental rewards are in question (e.g., air and water 
quality, Guyse, Keller, & Eppel, 2002; nuclear and hazard-
ous wastes, Moser, Stauffacher, Smieszek, Seidl, Krütli, & 
Scholz, 2013; improvements in green space and storm-
water control as well as reducing greenhouse gasses, 
Richards & Green, 2015). Furthermore, we did not find an 
effect of social power on monetary temporal discounting 
either2 (see supplementary material available at osf.io/
j67ep).
Regarding the manipulation of power, it must be noted 
that the episodic power priming is also a widespread para-
digm (Galinsky, Rucker, & Magee, 2015) that has already 
been successfully used in German and Swiss samples (e.g., 
Schmid & Schmid Mast, 2013; Scholl & Sassenberg, 2014). 
In fact, noting that sometimes one and the same article 
reports similar findings across studies with priming or 
role-based manipulations, power researchers have argued 
for the superiority of priming manipulations because 
it “remove[s] issues of conscious awareness or intent” 
(Smith & Trope, 2006, p. 580) or because “it can be difficult 
to manipulate power in an ethical, believable, and effective 
way in the laboratory” (Smith & Galinsky, 2010, p. 928). 
However, we think it is possible that the simplicity of 
this paradigm is offset by its inability to reliably produce 
a sense of power that would affect participant’s decision-
making – at least when administered online. Although our 
manipulation check indicated that participants followed 
instructions and provided examples of situations that dif-
fered in experienced power, a closer look at the proper-
ties of the texts produced by participants reveals that the 
intensity of the manipulation may have been rather low. 
Participants in this online study wrote on average 264 
characters (SD = 246, range from 13 to 2352 characters) 
and took about Mdn = 197 seconds to do so. Assuming 
that the average reading speed (German, aloud) is 11.5 
characters per second (SD = 5.5, Trauzettel-Klosinski & 
Dietz, 2012) and the average typing speed is 2.82 char-
acters per second (Soukoreff & Mackenzie, 1995), partici-
pants would have needed about 118 seconds on average 
for reading and writing and accordingly would have had 
79 seconds left to find a suitable situation and put them-
selves in this situation. This might not have been enough 
time to really experience the imagined situation. In fact, 
the differences in sense of power that we observed across 
conditions were non-significant and negligible in terms of 
effect size. Although this may in part be due to the fact 
that we did not modify the original items so that they 
would explicitly refer to the current situation (as opposed 
to the dispositional sense of power), it is noteworthy that 
a standard power manipulation did not leave its mark on 
a reliable measure of felt power. 
In order to enhance the effectiveness of the episodic 
priming manipulation, a reviewer suggested freezing the 
survey on the manipulation page and asking participants 
to visualize the respective situation (e.g., by adding the 
prompt to picture the faces of the other people involved, 
to imagine talking with the person and to try to feel 
the other people there with them). We agree that these 
additional instructions may serve to intensify the prim-
ing manipulation. Another explanation for our inability 
to replicate the effect of power on self-control could be 
a weak explicit concept association between social power 
and self-control. Given that priming occurs as a result of 
spreading activation of related concepts in memory, larger 
effects should be found for strongly associated concept 
pairs (Salomon, 2016). We have reason to believe that the 
concepts of power and self-control might be only weakly 
associated (data from an unrelated pilot study).
In summary, as the power manipulation used here 
did not affect felt power, it seems fair to begin by ques-
tioning the superiority of the episodic priming para-
digm rather than by concluding that there is no effect 
of social power on self-control. Perhaps the claim that 
“[a]ll the ways of manipulating power seem to have 
similar effects“ (Smith & Galinsky, 2010, p. 928) should 
be evaluated more systematically, either through meta-
analysis or via pre-registered comparisons. The alterna-
tive hypothesis would be that some of the effects of 
power require more intense feelings of power and/or 
conscious awareness of being in a powerful or powerless 
situation. Future research using different manipulations 
and operationalizations of both constructs is needed to 
clarify this effect and help adjudicate between the oppo-
site predictions regarding the direction of the effect. The 
present research suggests that episodic priming may not 
be an ideal vehicle for this effort.
Acknowledgement
We thank Carolin Lorber for her support in data collec-
tion, and Naomi Gellner and Simone Sebben for their help 
with coding the responses from the priming task.
Funding Statement
The authors received no financial support for the research, 
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Competing interests
The authors have no competing interests to declare.
Notes
 1 For simplicity we report calculations based on the 
assumption of equal per cell sample sizes because 
assuming unequal cell sizes does not alter our conclu-
sions.
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 2 Note that comparisons with the monetary delay dis-
counting task have to be interpreted with caution as 
due to dropouts the sample is much smaller than in 
the main analyses.
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